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Economic Individualism and Preference
Formation
Andrzej Rapaczynski

Abstract
This note examines some issues involved in an attempt to go beyond the assumption, long-made by
most economists, that people’s preferences are simply to be treated as “given” and that the principle
of consumer sovereignty entails a refusal to consider some (or some people’s) revealed preferences
as more authoritative than others. The most important break with that assumption has been the
development of behavioral economics, which shows that people may not always know what they
really want, and that economists have to develop a more critical approach, distinguishing people’s
true preferences from those that are merely apparent. While this approach, a version of which is
proposed by Michael Woodford, might very well be needed to explain various otherwise mysterious ways in which actual societies defy economists’ predictions based on the assumption of purely
rational behavior, it also involves a danger of replacing an empirical investigation of human choice
with a normative account of what people should chose--or might chose under some sort of “ideal
conditions” that reduce the diversity of human preferences to merely erroneous deviations from
what reason and human nature demand. To solve this conundrum, economics might need to incorporate a more robust theory of human choice, perhaps along the lines proposed by Robert Shiller
and Edmund Phelps. Such a theory would bring economics closer to other social sciences, such as
history, psychology, and maybe even ethics and aesthetics.
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It may be somewhat surprising to see a group of economists celebrating the anniversary of
Martin Luther’s 95 Theses by considering the significance of his ideas for economic thought.
Luther did not have much, and clearly nothing of importance, to say on any subject that
we would today consider directly related to economic analysis. But perhaps not surprisingly,
Luther’s focus on the central place of the individual and his de-emphasis of the role of
the community in mediating the relation between human beings and God—understood
as the ultimate measure of any worth in this world—is something that naturally resonates
with economists, who believe that individual preferences, rather than communal choices,
constitute the basis of the economic system.
To be sure, unlike economists’ stress on consumer sovereignty, which sees the
individual as free to pursue his own goals rather than conforming to the value choices and
opinions of others, Luther’s emphasis on faith as the sole basis of salvation focuses more
on the hardship than on emancipation as the main consequence of individual responsibility.
Indeed, Luther’s rejection of the idea that participation in an earthly community can help
save one from damnation leaves the individual alone and essentially powerless in his striving
for the highest human good of salvation. Still, an examination of the difficulties inherent
in an often simplistic idea of individual preferences underlying much of modern economic
theory may reveal that pursuing some implications of Luther’s individualism can open the
way to a more fruitful development of economic theory in the future.
Let’s start with the increasingly controversial idea at the core of yesterday’s (and
still largely today’s) economic theory: that individual preferences, taken as the ultimate basis
of human actions and the driving force of economic developments, are to be treated as
simply “given” and “revealed” by the subjects. As Michael Woodford1 and other behavioral
economists point out, things are more complicated because people’s preferences are often
inconsistent and unreliable; under many circumstances, people might “reveal” preferences
that we have reason to believe are, in some sense, not really theirs. Moreover, as Robert Shiller’s
recent work2 suggests, we may need to go beyond the behaviorist account and provide a
social theory of preference formation, which explains how various “narratives” about reality
spread among economic agents and influence their behavior. Indeed, Edmund Phelps3 goes
still further by arguing that neo-classical economics cannot account for the transformative
moments in economic history, such as explosive growth and decline of productivity, without
reference to broader cultural forces that affect dynamism and innovation.
All these critiques suggest that neglecting the intricacies of how people come to
See Michael Woodford’s contribution to this issue: “Individualistic Welfare Analysis in the Age of Behavioral Science,” Capitalism and Society 13, no. 1 (September 2018).
2
Robert J. Shiller, “Narrative Economics,” American Economic Review 107, no. 4 (April 2017): 967–1004.
3
Edmund Phelps, Mass Flourishing (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2013).
1
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form and reveal their preferences weakens the foundations of economic theory and impairs
economists’ ability to explain some widely observed distortions of expected outcomes. On
the other hand, the possibility that people’s preferences, as revealed in a fairly simple and
uncontroversial fashion, may not in fact be “really” theirs also opens a host of complex
issues that may not be easily handled with the standard tools economists have used in
the past. Insights and methods from other fields of scientific analysis, such as behavioral
psychology or neurological science, may be of some help. But a robust theory of how
human beings come to have these or other preferences and make choices determining their
behavior is likely to bring us back to many old philosophical, political, and ethical dilemmas
that economics was supposed to finesse in favor of a more “scientific” account.
To say that individual preferences are not simply “given” and that people may be
“wrong” about what they really want can mean two very different things. It may point to
a cognitive difficulty: the researcher (and the subject himself) may have trouble finding out
what the subject really wants because the subject’s habitual behavior makes him incapable
of properly assessing the consequences of his actions, or because there is some “noise” in
the circumstances under which the question is posed. But in the other case, the researcher
may be making a normative claim: there is no doubt about what the subject in fact wants, but
the subject’s preferences are still not considered really his because they are in another sense
wrong—they are not “objectively” in the subject’s best interest and the subject should not hold
them.
In fact, we are dealing here with two different understandings of what it means for an
individual to have a preference, or of the way in which a preference belongs to an individual.
At one extreme, self-revelation—the subject’s actual identification of a preference as his or
her own—is an indispensable anchor of what is in the true interest of the subject. Without
such an identification, an external observer may perhaps believe that something I don’t
recognize as such is nevertheless in my best interest (as defined in terms of some objective
criteria). But this is still not enough to identify the relevant “objectively better” preferences
as in any sense mine or—and this is crucial—to substitute the observer’s desire to make me
better off for the choice that I, wisely or not, have made myself.4
On this understanding, the subjective state of having a preference is definitional
with respect to one’s “true” interest, and indeed to one’s very personal identity. In other
It has been suggested by Cass Sunstein and Richard Thaler that individuals may be “nudged” toward a
choice that policymakers are confident reflects better the agents’ true interests than the alternatives the agents
themselves may think they prefer. While there may be a cost to an agent who insists on his own choices and
does not follow the policymakers’ suggestions, the very fact that a “nudge” does not really force anyone to
do anything—so that the agent’s own choice is the ultimate criterion of his interest—is the reason Sunstein
and Thaler believe that nudging is not illegitimate. See: Richard H. Thaler and Cass R. Sunstein, Nudge: Improving Decisions About Health, Wealth, And Happiness (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2008).
4
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words, all kinds of my likes and dislikes are at the core of who I am, even if others don’t
share them or if acting on them may be self-defeating. In this context, for an external
observer to say that the subject is mistaken about what she really wants at most amounts to a
prediction that, when confronted with more facts or helped to understand the source of her
error, the subject herself will simply recognize that she was wrong in what she thought she
wanted. On the other hand, if the subject resists such corrective attempts, the observer may
come to believe that the subject is not wise, but the observer cannot deny that the subject’s
own choice is a defining element of what is in her interest. By analogy, I may believe that your
preference for Warhol over Matisse is very foolish, but unless and until I persuade you that
Matisse is a better artist, I cannot say that you are making a mistake about what you “really”
like. Given how constitutive aesthetic preferences are with respect to our personal identity,
what I am saying in the end is that I would prefer you to be a different person than you in
fact are.
At the other extreme is an objectivist view of human identity that, outside of a
narrow area of ethics, finds few open adherents today, but which used to be held by many
people, including most communists and quite a few religious believers. According to this
view, what is “good” for human beings is essentially a matter of objective knowledge, so a
better-informed person (perhaps a wise leader) might know better than I do what my true
needs are, and thus also what I really want. From the objectivist perspective, the opposite of
a “true” preference is not a preference that is merely apparent, but one that is normatively
“wrong.” When I am wrong in this sense, the problem is not just with my self-knowledge; it
goes to the very core of who I am. Indeed, if I do not change my mind about what I want,
my actual preference will carry no authority because it does not correspond to what will
make me live in accordance with my true nature and pursue my real needs and desires. To
be sure, proper education (or indoctrination) may bring me to see the light, but the light is
the light whether or not I see it, and—to paraphrase Jean-Jacques Rousseau5—the individual
might in the end be forced to be “authentically” himself.
To be sure, there is an area of human choices in which many people still believe that
the objectivist account is right: the domain of ethics or basic moral judgments. The choice
to kill someone or betray a friend is not thought to be a matter of individual preference,
but rather a violation of an objective imperative that every agent must obey. It is possible,
of course, to say that a person violating these kinds of ethical rules has a “preference” to
harm someone, and deserves punishment precisely because such preferences are a result
of his choices and reflect his personal identity. But unlike in the case of most preferences
considered by an economist committed to the concept of consumer sovereignty—which
implies that each individual’s preference counts in the same way as a preference of any other
5

Jean-Jacques Rousseau, The Social Contract, book 1, chap. 7.
5
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economic agent—a preference violating a moral principle does not carry any authority and
is seen as conferring no legitimacy on its satisfaction.6
Moral rules may therefore be seen as fixed, general constraints, derived from the
principles of reason or from a general theory of human nature, and not subject to individual
differences. But a broad objectivist view that sees all (or even just most) human preferences
as similarly constrained is clearly incompatible with recognizing a wide diversity of legitimate
individual life plans, and thus with the commitment to individualism underlying the market
economy (and probably the very idea of human freedom).
Perhaps in response to this objection, some thinkers have tried to marry the
objectivist approach with the acknowledgement of individual choice by deploying the socalled “contractarian” approach. According to this approach, the best interest of an individual
may still be seen as consisting in what the individual ultimately chooses for himself; the
choice in question, however, is not any choice, but one that would be made under some sort
of ideal conditions.
Now “ideal conditions” is an ambiguous and potentially theory-laden term. It may
simply and uncontroversially mean that people’s preferences have more authority when
formed in the absence of undue pressure and with access to proper information. I am
pretty sure this is what Woodford has in mind when he talks about “ideal conditions.” True,
Woodford does say that economists and policymakers can arrive at a guess of what an
individual would choose under such conditions without being able to observe the actual
choice of the preferences they are imputing to the subject. Nonetheless, the question remains
always fundamentally empirical and, like all empirical hypotheses, subject to experimental
falsification. At no point does Woodford ask what the subject should choose, but rather what
she will choose under certain conditions designed to help her make a better decision according
to her own lights. The observer’s claim about a subject’s true preference in such a case does not
involve any norm by which the agent is bound, but is just a prediction of what the subject will in
fact choose when some objectively determined obstacles to self-knowledge are eliminated.
The same is not necessarily true when someone like John Rawls asks what choices
would be made in an “original position” under a “veil of ignorance,” 7 or when Jürgen
Habermas speaks of “ideal speech conditions.” 8 Both of these philosophers are committed
It is noteworthy, however, that some economic thinkers, especially law-and-economics theorists, do tend
to reduce moral reasoning to standard cost-benefit analysis, and are thus ready to weigh the satisfaction of a
criminal’s preference against the harm to the victims. An often-cited example is Judge Posner’s analysis of the
criminalization of rape with the help of a comparison of the utility of a rapist with the disutilities of the rest
of society. See Richard A. Posner, “An Economic Theory of the Criminal Law,” Columbia Law Review 85, no.
6 (October 1985): 1193-1231.
7
John Rawls, A Theory of Justice (Cambridge: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1971).
8
Jürgen Habermas, The Theory of Communicative Action (Boston: Beacon Press, 1984).
6
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to a legitimization of social and economic arrangements by uncoerced choices of individuals,
and both of their theories contain nuances that are difficult to summarize. Still, the insistence
by both on the possibility of consensus with respect to a rather comprehensive model of
human life suggests that the question of what would be chosen under ideal conditions may
very well cease to be an empirical one and turn on an a priori reasoning, such as the one
characteristic of mathematical or ethical propositions. The very idea of a “veil of ignorance”
strips individuals of all qualities that distinguish them from one another and assumes that
all rational beings are in most important respects the same. But then we are not dealing with
any “contract,” and nothing depends on what choices will in fact be made. In the end, it is
a single self that decides everything on the basis of the rules of reason alone and, much
as in the case of Immanuel Kant’s categorical imperative, the metaphor of the “veil of
ignorance” (or other “ideal conditions”) in fact stands for the a priori character of the results.
If you don’t agree with the outcome, you are not making any real choice—you are simply
not being rational, much as when you commit a logical or an arithmetical mistake.
This is exactly what makes the ideal-conditions device problematic: when so
understood, it becomes incompatible with a robust theory of human freedom and individual
choice. Apart from some basic moral decisions, human choices contain a genuine element
of contingency and are not in fact subject to such overpowering constraints that they can be
simply deduced from the concept of pure rationality. Indeed, it is this element of contingency
that poses a true challenge for both an economic theory of preference formation and a
more general theory of action underlying the economic account of human behavior.
Whether human preferences are seen as an object of a strictly empirical or of an essentially
normative inquiry, preferences are often assumed to be static: already there and subject
to proper discovery. In fact, however, regardless of how good the economists’ methods
of error correction are in assessing human preferences, the job does not really end there
because the very object of the study may be in a state of flux. As Shiller points out, human
preferences are not really “given” at all, either in the sense of the subjects having a set of
stable inclinations, or in the sense of there being a set of unequivocally right choices that,
under certain conditions, rational individuals can be confidently expected to make. Indeed,
even perfectly rational individuals—as long as they are human—may not at most points in
time have a well-ordered set of preferences, because preferences are a central part of who
we are, and who we are is always a work in progress.
So sometimes our preferences are unstable just because we are not perfectly rational
and are making mistakes about what we want. But sometimes our preferences simply change
because we discover something new or consider hitherto absent alternatives. This type of
discovery is not the same as scientific discovery, in which we learn something that was there,
true at all times and waiting to be discovered. The sense of discovery at issue here is of a
7
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kind involved in artistic creation: when Matisse painted his Dance, he was not uncovering
something that had been there before (perhaps only in the form of a Platonic idea); he genuinely created something new that had not been there at all.
This process of creative self-discovery, which also shapes the evolution of our preferences, is most often a social rather than a solitary pursuit: it is an extended, indeed continuous, social conversation about what is good, desirable, valuable, beautiful, etc. And the
medium of this conversation is what Shiller calls “narrative,” i.e., a more or less integrated
“story” that is supposed to make sense of some otherwise obscure aspects of social reality. Some of these narratives are better than others, and the weaker ones may lead us into
error that distorts, more than enlightens, the reality around us. But while Shiller sometimes
focuses on those kinds of misleading narratives in order to explain otherwise inexplicable
stretches of economic history, at the root of our openness to these narratives is not just a
proneness to error. The main significance of our susceptibility to the various narratives lies
in their being part of that continuous conversation about what goals we should be pursuing, how we should live, what we should like or dislike, etc. Our whole culture is very much
composed of such debates, and a basic feature of them, in a liberal society above all, is that
they concern not just who we are, but who we want to be, what gives our life meaning, and
where we are going. And all this is also reflected in what we pursue and the choices we make
as economic agents and consumers.
Which brings us back to Luther. The community, for Luther, is not an intermediary
between our finitude and divine perfection. It cannot mediate between us and God and
does not help us obtain salvation because salvation is an inherently individual matter. But
then Luther is also very skeptical about our individual ability to save ourselves. Salvation
could be “deserved” only by one’s living a morally perfect life, following the absolutely
unbending, objective commands of Divine Will—something that we, given our weakness,
cannot possibly accomplish. So if Logos (for God is also infinitely rational) and Divine
morality is all there is, we are completely dependent on God’s mercy, and our earthly lives
are essentially empty. But aside from the properly theological aspect of Lutheranism (that
we can only be saved by faith and Divine Grace), there are also the extremely interesting and
modern practical consequences of Luther’s postulate of the inefficacy of both communal
and individual searches for righteousness and rationality. For the fact that our “works”
cannot save us does not change the fact that we need to—indeed must—live and act, and
in this secular sphere of our lives, the community is very important. Our actions may be
inherently flawed and imperfect, but we cannot just do nothing either. Somewhere between
nothingness and eternity is our very own life that we have to live, and we can only do it by
our own lights. The big principles that are “given” to us (the Ten Commandments) provide
only the most basic framework of the game we are playing—they don’t determine how to
8
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play it and we don’t play it alone. How to fill our earthly existence depends on what we make
of ourselves, both as a community and as autonomous individuals.
The challenge to economists like Shiller, who do not want to assume that preferences
are just “given” and that their formation is pre-economic, is thus to integrate into economics
a more general social theory accounting for how we change and what we learn as we go. In
this sense, an economic theory of preference formation, as well as the role various narratives
play in it, is not just a theory of economic agents’ errors and their correction—it is a theory
capable of coming to terms with the meaning of the continuous creative cultural process
that contains genuine change and innovation. Edmund Phelps is perhaps the foremost
economist to have stressed the importance of innovation not just for economic growth, but
perhaps above all for human flourishing and our own life-satisfaction. So to study human
creativity inherent in economic change, we may need to expand our ideas of what economic
theory looks like. Should we think of economics as containing aesthetic, historical, and
moral dimensions? Perhaps a true economic theory of human behavior also contains a
whole liberal theory of “good life,” with its constant choice, innovation, and self-creation?
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